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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiff-appellants, thirty-six project engineers and one 
supervising engineer (DOT engineers), filed this lawsuit 
against the State of New Jersey, Department of 
Transportation (State), in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey. The lawsuit seeks overtime 
compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1978). The DOT engineers 
alleged that the State violated the FLSA by failing to pay 
them "time and a half" for time worked in excess of 40 
hours per week. The State responded that the DOT 
engineers are exempt professionals under the "salary-basis" 
test,1 promulgated by the United States Department of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. An exempt professional under the salary-basis test is an employee 
who is, in effect, an executive who is salaried and does not perform work 
on an hourly basis. A non-exempt individual performs work on an hourly 
basis and therefore qualifies for overtime compensation. 
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Labor (DOL) and codified at 29 C.F.R. § 541.118, as 
amended by 29 C.F.R. § 541.5d (1996). The DOT engineers 
replied that because their wages are subject to reduction 
under the DOT's disciplinary policy, they are hourly 
workers and are not exempt under the DOL regulations. 
 
The district court granted the State's motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed the DOT engineers' complaint. It 
held that the "salary-basis" test is not applicable to public 
employees such as the DOT engineers and, even if it were 
applicable, the engineers are exempt because the DOT has 
never actually deducted pay under its disciplinary policy. 
 
The DOT engineers appealed, and on May 16, 1996, we 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case 
with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of 
the DOT engineers awarding back-pay for overtime for the 
period commencing September 6, 1991. We held that the 
"salary-basis" test, as amended in September 1991, applies 
to the DOT engineers. However, we further held that the 
DOT engineers fail to satisfy the "salary-basis" test because 
the DOT's disciplinary policy subjects them to reductions in 
pay for non-safety related infractions. 
 
On March 27, 1996, the United States Supreme Court 
issued an opinion that abruptly changed the law regarding 
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996). Prior to Seminole, 
the Supreme Court had held that Congress could abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, subjecting states to private 
causes of action. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 
U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2273 (1989). Seminole overruled Union 
Gas and held that the Commerce Clause did not invest 
Congress with the authority to waive states' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity and to create private causes of 
action against states that had not consented to such suits. 
116 S.Ct. at 1127-28, 1131-32. 
 
The State filed a petition for rehearing, relying in part on 
the Supreme Court's Seminole decision. By order dated July 
9, 1996, we granted the State's petition for panel rehearing 
and vacated our May 16, 1996 opinion. See Balgowan v. 
State of New Jersey, Dept. of Transp., 84 F.3d 667 (3d Cir. 
1996). We ordered rebriefing by the parties, addressing, 
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among other issues, the State's claim that the Supreme 
Court's decision in Seminole divested us of jurisdiction. On 
September 23, 1996, the DOT engineers filed their opening 
brief, and on November 22, 1996, the State filed its 
responsive brief. The DOT engineers filed their reply brief 
on December 31, 1996. On that same day the DOT 
engineers filed a motion to amend their complaint in order 
to add the DOT Commissioner as a defendant, and to 
include a claim for prospective declaratory and injunctive 




We first address the DOT engineers' motion to amend. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 provides that "[p]arties 
may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion 
of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the 
action and on such terms as are just." FED . R. CIV. P. 21. 
"Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strictly apply 
only in the district courts, [FED. R. CIV. P. 1], the policies 
informing Rule 21 may apply equally to the courts of 
appeals." Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 
826, 832, 109 S.Ct. 2218, 2223 (1989). Rule 21 and an 
appellate power that "long predates the enactment of the 
Federal Rules" have been relied upon by appellate courts to 
both dismiss and add parties in order to maintain 
jurisdiction and standing. Id. at 834, 109 S.Ct. at 2223 
(allowing dismissal of non-diverse party on appeal); see also 
Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 416-17, 72 S.Ct. 428, 
429-30 (1952) (avoiding union's standing issue by granting 
motion to add two of its members as parties on appeal); 
Bhatla v. U.S. Capital Corp., 990 F.2d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 
1993) (exercising court's discretion to dismiss action versus 
non-diverse dispensable party so that case could proceed). 
Resort to Rule 21 is appropriate where "requiring dismissal 
after years of litigation would impose unnecessary and 
wasteful burdens on the parties, judges, and other litigants 
waiting for judicial attention." Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 
836, 109 S.Ct. at 2225 (citing Mullaney, 342 U.S. at 417, 
72 S.Ct. at 430). 
 
The State argues that we should deny the DOT engineers' 
motion to amend the complaint because the engineers 
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"waited seven months before presenting their motion." 
Appellee Br. in Opp'n. to Mot. to Amend Compl. at 11. It 
also claims that there is a lack of "express statutory 
authority to amend in the appellate court [and a] 
constitutional and statutory bar on the DOT engineer[s'] 
proposed claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive 
relief." Id. at 13. In light of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the relevant case law, the unexpected turn in 
the law as a result of Seminole, and the availability of 
declaratory relief, we do not find the State's arguments 
persuasive. 
 
First, as we have previously stated, FED. R. CIV. P. 21 
provides that plaintiffs may be permitted to add parties at 
any stage of the action, including in the court of appeals. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 21. See also Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 
832-33, 109 S.Ct. at 2222; Bhatla, 990 F.2d at 786. 
Second, given the change in the law effected by Seminole, 
we would be hard-pressed to fault the engineers for not 
having moved to amend the complaint sooner. Third, the 
State has not identified any prejudice to it resulting from 
the delay. See Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 838, 109 S.Ct. 
at 2225-26. Finally, as will be discussed below, the DOT 
engineers are not precluded from seeking prospective 
declaratory relief. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 
S.Ct. 441 (1908). See also Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 
23, 26 (3d Cir. 1981); Berman Enters., Inc. v. Jorling, 3 F.3d 
602, 606-07 (2d Cir. 1993). Therefore, we grant the DOT 




Now that we have permitted the DOT engineers' to amend 
their complaint, we must determine whether we have 
jurisdiction to address their claims. Under the teachings of 
Seminole, we do not have jurisdiction over the DOT 
engineers' claim against the State for monetary relief. 
Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 1127-28. However, by allowing the 
DOT engineers to amend their complaint naming the DOT 
Commissioner as an additional party and adding a claim 
for prospective declaratory relief, we may retain jurisdiction 
under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 128 
S.Ct. 441 (1908). In Ex Parte Young, the Supreme Court 
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carved out an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity 
by permitting citizens to sue state officials when the 
litigation seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order to 
end continuing violations of federal law. Id. The Ex Parte 
Young exception has been interpreted by courts to allow 
suits against state officials for both prospective injunctive 
and declaratory relief. See, e.g., Laskaris, 661 F.2d at 26; 
Berman, 3 F.3d at 606-07; Roller v. Cavanaugh, 984 F.2d 
120, 122 (4th Cir. 1993). Although Ex Parte Young's exact 
wording allows suits for prospective injunctive relief, the 
1908 opinion was issued well before declaratory relief was 
available. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466, 94 
S.Ct. 1209, 1219 (1974) (In 1934 Congress enacted the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, in 
order "to provide a milder alternative to the injunction 
remedy.") (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111, 91 
S.Ct. 674, 690 (1971) (Brennan, J. concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)). 
 
Only the Secretary of Labor may initiate an action for 
injunctive relief under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) 
("Except as provided in section 212 of this title[child labor 
provisions], the Administrator [Secretary of Labor]2 shall 
bring all actions under section 217 of this title to restrain 
violations of this chapter."); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 
U.S. 575, 581, 98 S.Ct. 866, 870 (1978); Bowe v. Judson C. 
Burns, Inc., 137 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1943); Barrentine v. 
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 750 F.2d 47, 51 (8th Cir. 
1984). Since the Secretary of Labor is the only party 
permitted to seek injunctive relief under the FLSA, and the 
Secretary is not a party to this action, injunctive relief is 
not available to the plaintiffs. However, private actions 
brought by employees for declaratory relief are permissible. 
See, e.g., Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1556 (10th Cir. 
1995); Biggs v. Wilson, 828 F. Supp. 774, 779 (E.D. Ca. 
1991), aff 'd, 1 F.3d 1537 (9th Cir. 1993). Therefore, we 
find that we have jurisdiction to reach the merits of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The functions of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of 
the Department of Labor, under the Act, were transferred to the 
Secretary of Labor pursuant to the Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1950, 
§ 1, eff. May 24, 1950, 15 Fed.Reg. 3174, 64 Stat. 1263, as amended 
Pub.L. 99-619, § 2(c)(1), Nov. 6, 1986, 100 Stat. 3491. 
 
                                6 
case and consider whether we can grant declaratory relief 




Having determined that the DOT engineers can amend 
their complaint and that we can properly consider 
declaratory relief, we now turn to the merits of the case. On 
this rehearing, we reconsider the legal issue of whether the 
DOT engineers are exempt from the overtime provisions of 
the FLSA. We reexamine this issue in view of a recently 
decided Supreme Court case, Auer v. Robbins, 117 S.Ct. 
905 (1997). Auer, like the instant case, involves the 
application of the FLSA professional exemption and the 
Department of Labor's "salary-basis" test. The factual 
situation in Auer is almost identical to the facts in the case 
at bar. In Auer, police sergeants and lieutenants employed 
by the City of St. Louis contended that they are "hourly" 
employees under the DOL's "salary-basis" test because 
their compensation is subject to deductions for disciplinary 
violations. They argued that they are "subject to" such 
deductions because "the Police Manual nominally subjects 
all department employees to a range of disciplinary 
sanctions that includes disciplinary deductions in pay, and 
because a single sergeant was actually subjected to a 
disciplinary deduction." Id. at 910. 
 
The primary issue considered by the Supreme Court in 
Auer was "whether. . . an employee's pay is `subject to' 
disciplinary or other deductions whenever there exists a 
theoretical possibility of such deductions, or rather only 
when there is something more to suggest that the employee 
is actually vulnerable to having his pay reduced." Id. Before 
reaching this issue, however, the Court addressed the 
police officers' claim that "the `no disciplinary deductions' 
element of the salary-basis test is invalid for public-sector 
employees." Id. at 909. It noted that "[t]he Secretary's view 
that public employers are not so differently situated with 
regard to disciplining their employees as to require 
wholesale revision of his time-tested rule simply cannot be 
said to be unreasonable." Id. The Court further held that 
the officers' "complaints about the [Secretary of Labor's] 
 
                                7 
failure to amend the disciplinary-deduction rule cannot be 
raised in the first instance in the present suit." Id. at 910. 
 
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Auer, we must 
sustain the Secretary of Labor's view and find that the "no 
disciplinary deductions" element of the "salary-basis" test is 
not invalid for public-sector employees. Also following Auer, 
we will not permit the engineers to raise here for the first 
time a claim that the Secretary of Labor has failed to 
amend the disciplinary-deduction rule in violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 
(1996). 
 
We now turn to the main issue in the case. In Auer, the 
Supreme Court deferred to the Secretary of Labor's 
interpretation of the disciplinary component of the "salary- 
basis" test. The Court held that the police officers were 
exempt from the overtime provisions. The Secretary of 
Labor's interpretation, adopted by the Supreme Court, 
states that exempt status will be denied only "when 
employees are covered by a policy that permits disciplinary 
or other deduction in pay `as a practical matter.' " Id. at 
911. The interpretation by the Secretary of Labor further 
provides that the "standard is met . . . if there is either an 
actual practice of making such deduction or an 
employment policy that creates a `significant likelihood' of 
such deductions." Id. Finally, there must be "a clear and 
particularized policy -- one which `effectively 
communicates' that deductions will be made in specified 
circumstances." Id. 
 
In Auer, the Court found that because the Police Manual 
nominally covered all department employees, it did not: 
 
"effectively communicate" that pay deductions are an 
anticipated form of punishment for employees in[the 
police sergeants and lieutenants'] category . . .. If the 
statement of available penalties applied solely to[the 
sergeants and lieutenants], matters would be different; 
but since it applies both to [them] and to employees 
who are unquestionably not paid on a salary basis, the 
expressed availability of disciplinary deductions may 
have reference only to the latter. 
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Id. (emphasis omitted). The fact that one sergeant was 
actually subjected to a disciplinary deduction did not alter 
the Court's analysis. 
 
Based on Auer, we conclude that the engineers in this 
matter qualify for the professional exemption under the 
FLSA. They are not realistically "subject to" reductions in 
their pay. At the DOT, there is neither an actual practice of 
making deductions, nor is there an "employment policy that 
creates a `significant likelihood' of such deductions" as 
required by the Supreme Court in Auer. Id. 
 
The disciplinary policy in this case, like that in Auer, 
applies to all DOT employees, not just the DOT engineers. 
Pursuant to Auer, such a broad-based policy fails to 
" `effectively communicate' that pay deductions are an 
anticipated form of punishment" for the DOT engineers. Id. 
Furthermore, the DOT's nonenforcement of its disciplinary 
policy and the fact that no engineer has ever suffered a 
reduction in pay under the policy, provide even stronger 
evidence that the DOT's disciplinary policy is not one under 
which there is a "significant likelihood" of deductions. 
 
As a final note, the Supreme Court in Auer stated that 
the salary test's "window of corrections," 29 C.F.R. 
§ 541.118(a)(6), is available to preserve the exempt status of 
employees who have been subjected to pay deductions 
inconsistent with the salary-basis test. The Court 
emphasized that the employer could reimburse employees 
not only if the deductions were "inadverten[t]", but also if 
they were "made for reasons other than lack of work." Auer, 
117 S.Ct. at 912 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(6) 
(alteration added)). Accordingly, if any DOT engineer's pay 
had been docked, the "window of corrections" exemption 
could have been used by the State to preserve that 




We hold that the DOT engineers can amend their 
complaint to name the DOT Commissioner as an additional 
party and add a claim for prospective declaratory relief. We 
further hold that we have jurisdiction to reach the merits of 
the case and consider declaratory relief. Even though we 
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allowed an amendment to the complaint and would 
normally order service to be made upon the DOT 
Commissioner, because the engineers cannot succeed on 
the merits under Auer, it would be futile to require service 
and processing of the amended complaint. In assessing the 
legal issues against the backdrop of Auer, we conclude that 
the "salary-basis" test set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a), as 
amended by 29 C.F.R. § 541.5d, is valid as applied to 
public employees such as the DOT engineers. Further, the 
DOT engineers satisfy the salary test because the DOT's 
disciplinary policy does not "permit[ ] disciplinary or other 
deductions in pay `as a practical matter.' " 
 
Hence, although the legal landscape has changed since 
the district court held for the state in its order of March 27, 
1995, and our analysis has accordingly been framed to 
reflect the dictates of Seminole and Auer, the conclusion we 
have reached is the same conclusion reached by the district 
court. We will therefore affirm the order granting summary 
judgment for the State. 
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